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Since the publication of Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century in 2014 
(translated by Arthur Goldhammer; originally published in French in 2013) based on his 
research during 1998-2013, this book has been translated into more than 30 languages. The 
English translation is a big book: 577 pages of main text, 76 pages of notes and 97 pages of 
technical appendix (available online). Piketty’s book traces the evolution of income and 
wealth inequality in the advanced countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan and 
United States) since the eighteenth century.  
The extensive empirical and historical commentary by Piketty points to one fundamental 
inequality: r > g, where ‘r stands for the average annual rate of return on capital, including 
profits, dividends, interest, rents, and other income from capital, expressed as a percentage 
of its total value, and g stands for the rate of growth of the economy’ (25). This inequality is 
responsible for creating ‘the fundamental force for divergence’ (424) in capitalist societies. 
Piketty’s solutions for combating widening inequalities are progressive global wealth tax 
(515), progressive income tax (493), substantial government expenditures (471) and not 
making markets ‘freer and more competitive’ (424).  
For Piketty, capitalism generates forces of convergence as well as divergence. ‘The main 
forces for convergence are the diffusion of knowledge and investment in training and skills’ 
(21). However, these forces are not automatic. Indeed, as Piketty notes, ‘the principal force 
for convergence—the diffusion of knowledge—is only partly natural and spontaneous. It also 
depends in large part on educational policies, access to training and to the acquisition of 
appropriate skills, and associated institutions’ (22, also 71). He underplays this element of 
contingency when he writes that the ‘overall conclusion of this study is that a market 
economy based on private property, if left to itself, contains powerful forces of convergence 
associated in particular with the diffusion of knowledge and skills’ (571). Piketty’s 
fundamental inequality, r > g, is ‘amplified by inequality in the returns on capital as a function 
of initial portfolio size’ (439) arising primarily from ‘“economies of scale” in portfolio 
management’ (431). In other words, wealth begets more wealth. Is it not the same with 
knowledge? Endowments matter in the acquisition of knowledge too because technological 
diffusion depends on existing technology and skill capacity. 
Various sources of data are creatively employed by Piketty. They include not only economic 
databases and reports but also literary sources. Examples of the latter include novels (Austen, 
Balzac, Pamuk, Tolstoy), Hollywood movies (Django Unchained, Titanic), TV series (Bones, 
House) and even the animated cartoon The Aristocats. Besides the World Top Income 
Database (and Maddison’s national accounts data), Piketty uses the reports published by 
Crédit Suisse, Forbes and the World Gold Council. He calls for transparency in data collection 
by public and private organizations and highlights the need for ‘reliable statistics’ as a 
prerequisite for a ‘truly democratic debate’ (519).  
2 
 
Throughout the book, Piketty emphasizes that the aim of the numbers he presents is to 
familiarize the readers with the broad ‘orders of magnitude’ with respect to inequality 
because it helps in ‘focusing one’s thoughts’ (438). The following excerpt encompasses one 
such order of magnitude: ‘global inequality ranges from regions in which the per capita 
income is on the order of 150–250 euros per month (sub-Saharan Africa, India) to regions 
where it is as high as 2,500–3,000 euros per month (Western Europe, North America, Japan), 
that is, ten to twenty times higher. The global average, which is roughly equal to the Chinese 
average, is around 600–800 euros per month’ (64). Another empirical observation is that ‘the 
capital/income ratio generally varies between 5 and 6, and the capital stock consists almost 
entirely of private capital’ in the developed countries (50). That is, the value of total assets 
(business, environmental, financial and housing) is equivalent to 5-6 years of national income. 
Further, ‘the rate of return on capital, r, depends on many technological, psychological, social, 
and cultural factors, which together seem to result in a return of roughly 4–5 percent’ (361). 
On the other hand, ‘global output grew at an average annual rate of 1.6 percent between 
1700 and 2012, 0.8 percent of which reflects population growth, while another 0.8 percent 
came from growth in output per head’ (73). The last two empirical facts form the basis for 
Piketty’s fundamental inequality of r > g; this is disconcerting because the ‘entrepreneur 
inevitably tends to become a rentier, more and more dominant over those who own nothing 
but their labor’ (571).  
On examining the ‘metamorphoses of capital in Europe and North America since the 
eighteenth century’, Piketty finds that ‘[o]ver the long run, the nature of wealth was totally 
transformed: capital in the form of agricultural land was gradually replaced by industrial and 
financial capital and urban real estate’ (164). A high rate of saving coupled with low economic 
growth ‘automatically gives rise to a structural increase in the long-run capital/income ratio’ 
(173), and therefore, as Piketty puts it, ‘what we are witnessing is a strong comeback of 
private capital in the rich countries since 1970’ (173). Some reasons for this comeback are 
privatization of public enterprises, dominance of inherited wealth, exploding CEO salaries and 
financial globalization (which has had a favourable impact on financial asset and real estate 
prices).  
It must be noted that Piketty does not have theoretical dissatisfactions with neoclassical 
(marginalist) economic principles. His disagreements are largely empirical. For instance, his 
criticism of marginal productivity theory arises from its inability to explain the exorbitantly 
high CEO salaries, while he considers it useful in determining the wages of ‘an assembly-line 
worker or fast-food server’ (331). Further, Piketty writes, ‘[o]ver the long run, education and 
technology are the decisive determinants of wage levels’ (307), thus neglecting the role 
played by workers’ collective movements and therefore democratic politics. Similarly, the 
problems with the time-preference theory of saving are that it is tautological and because ‘it 
is impossible to encapsulate all savings behavior and all attitudes toward the future in a single 
inexorable psychological parameter’ (359). Piketty disagrees with Modigliani’s life-cycle 
theory because ‘the massive dissaving by the elderly predicted by the life-cycle theory of 
saving does not seem to occur, no matter how much life expectancy increases’ (400).  
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Piketty rightly points out in the initial pages of his book that ‘[w]ithout precisely defined 
sources, methods, and concepts, it is possible to see everything and its opposite’ (2-3). His 
empirical measurements reflect this position well and he presents the limitations of the data. 
However, his understanding of the capital controversies of the 1960s, which was about the 
measurement of ‘capital’, is fundamentally flawed. ‘In my view, the virulence—and at times 
sterility—of the Cambridge capital controversy was due in part to the fact that participants 
on both sides lacked the historical data needed to clarify the terms of the debate’ (232). It 
was a debate surrounding the logically problematic theoretical measurement of capital in 
marginalist economics which could never have been resolved with any amount of historical 
data.  
The growth theory found in Piketty’s Capital is supply-side in nature, in line with that of Solow 
and mainstream textbooks on growth. In Piketty, ‘g measures the long-term structural growth 
rate, which is the sum of productivity growth and population growth’ (228). Furthermore, 
growth can be ‘encouraged by investing in education, knowledge, and non-polluting 
technologies’ (572). While it is of course necessary to invest in education, health, and non-
polluting technologies, remember that investment plays a dual role – it is a component of 
current aggregate demand and creates future capacity – and hence, it may not be sufficient 
for economic growth. Consequently, to assume that the growth in aggregate supply would 
generate an equivalent growth in aggregate demand is unwarranted.  
With regard to economic policy, Piketty favours, and rightly so, a progressive tax on all forms 
of wealth because as mentioned earlier, wealth begets more wealth. This is all the more 
needed because the widening inequalities of income and wealth ‘are potentially threatening 
to democratic societies and to the values of social justice’ (571). Other worrisome trends are 
the ‘cuts in corporate tax rates and to the exemption of interest, dividends, and other financial 
revenues from the taxes to which labor incomes are subject’ due to ‘the recent rise of tax 
competition in a world of free-flowing capital’ (496). It is indeed, as Piketty writes, ‘an illusion 
to think that something about the nature of modern growth or the laws of the market 
economy ensures that inequality of wealth will decrease and harmonious stability will be 
achieved’ (376).  
Besides one complaint that the book lacks a separate bibliography, it is written, rather 
translated, in a very accessible manner for the non-specialist and interspersed with 
interesting socio-economic data from literary sources. There is a wealth of empirical 
questions for the Indian researcher in the numerous tables and illustrations found in the book. 
Lastly, parts of the book can even be used as readings in undergraduate classes.  
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